You Can't Play Chicken By Committee

Though it hasn't been confirmed, the AP is reporting that the Democratic leadership has grudgingly agreed to provide President Bush with a war funding bill that does not contain a timeline for withdrawal. This news has, understandably, angered and disappointed many on the left who think that the Democrats have folded despite having the better (and more righteous) hand. As Hilzoy explains:

If the Congress wants to turn this situation to political advantage, they should present Bush with a bill that will either help to end the war if he passes it, or make him seem unreasonable if he doesn't. He would seem unreasonable, for instance, if he vetoed a bill simply because it had a waivable deadline, or because it required that he report on the Iraqi government's progress, or if it required that troops meet the basic standards of readiness the armed forces theoretically require. Any of these things would also weaken Bush's position, in different ways: the readiness provision by making it clear that the troops are not, in fact, meeting those standards (nor can they; I don't mean to suggest that this is in some way their fault); the others by putting Bush in a position in which he has to explain why, exactly, he thinks that his surge is a good idea, or by forcing him to make increasingly unrealistic statements about progress.

You win, politically, by structuring things in such a way that it becomes clear why your position is right and your opponent's position is wrong. . . . In this particular case, structuring things so that both the weakness of Bush's position and his unreasonableness become clear is also essential to ending the war. What burns me about the idea of just caving to Bush is that it does nothing towards this end. It's just capitulation.

I don't disagree with this analysis, but here's the rub: by any reasonable metric, the Democrats have already won this debate. The public supports their position by a 70/30 margin. The problem is that this president is immune to normal political pressures. He's been resigned for some time now to the fact that only about 30% of the country is with him on this. And he knows that that 30% is pretty solidly behind him. He's not running for re-election, and he cares only about his long term legacy. In other words, despite having lost the political fight, he feels no pressure to concede.

What that means is that no matter how well the Democrats manage to frame this funding stalemate, no matter how unreasonable they manage to make Bush look, he will not give an inch. The normal rules have to be thrown out the window. As Hilzoy concedes at the end of her post:

The one thing that gives me pause: Maybe I am, as they used to say, Blinded by Bush Hatred, but for what it's worth: I do not put it past Bush to respond to any actual cutting off of funds by leaving the troops high and dry in some utterly avoidable way and blaming it on Congress. I don't even put it past him to respond in this way to some sort of waivable deadline such that if he doesn't do something or other (e.g., certify progress of some sort), funds will be cut off. Nothing in Bush's record suggests to me that he would be above, say, letting the troops run out of money, or bullets, or gasoline to make a political point. If I were in Congress, I would rather give Bush the money than risk that. It's succumbing to blackmail, but there are worse things to do.

That's exactly it. Bush almost surely has the weaker hand here, but he's quite prepared to go all in anyway, and he's betting with the lives of American soldiers. It's not fair and it's not right, but that's who we're dealing with and at the end of the day, someone has to be the adult.

There's a profound structural asymmetry on display here as well. If you'll pardon the shifting metaphor, playing chicken is all about guessing when the other person will flinch. But in this particular game of chicken, we have a large deliberative body on one side and a single stubborn man on the other. In such a fight, the individual has an enormous advantage. There may well be some point at which President Bush would flinch, but the Democrats in Congress have no idea what that point is (or if there even is such a point). They have no insight into his deliberations. They don't know how far they'd have to push him. They don't know if he's having doubts about his ability to sell the public on his position or withstand Congressional pressure.

For Congressional leaders, on the other hand, it is almost impossible to keep their deliberations private. In any coalition, there will be disagreements over strategy. Some will have doubts about the wisdom of the plan being pursued. There will invariably be discussions about how far the members are willing to go, how long they can keep the public on their side, when they should be prepared to concede. These deliberations will inevitably be made public, thereby telegraphing to the other side just how far Congressional leaders are prepared to go before flinching. Which is just a long way of saying that it's really hard to play chicken by committee.

Combine that basic structural asymmetry with Bush's general immunity to political pressure and willingness to risk the safety of the troops, and it's pretty hard to envision an outcome that doesn't involve the Democrats largely conceding to Bush's demands, at least this time around.

I suppose that's why I'll be a little more forgiving than some if it turns out that the AP is right. I'm all for taking whatever steps we can to hasten the day our troops start coming home from Iraq, but as long as Bush is president, there just aren't very many options at the Democrats' disposal. As president, Bush can essentially hold our troops hostage and use the implicit threat to their safety as leverage to keep his own policies going. Unless a significant percentage of the Republican party is willing to join with the Democrats in pushing for withdrawal, withdrawal is not likely to happen during the remainder of Bush's term.