The NIE: A New Talking Point Emerges

The standard GOP response to the suggestion (backed up by the recently leaked NIE) that our invasion of Iraq has made the terrorism problem worse is to deny, deny, deny. We're repeatedly subjected to the insanely stupid argument that because terrorists attacked us before we invaded Iraq, it is simply not possible that our invasion of Iraq could have exacerbated the problem. This "argument" is, of course, utterly unconvincing and easily dispatched.

But I've noticed a new talking point emerging in the last few days. Perhaps the best example is this post by Jonah Goldberg at The Corner. Goldberg writes:

Folks, regardless of the details of the NIE controversy can I just say that I'm not particularly troubled by the NIE's alleged finding that the Iraq war has increased terrorism. I mean, doesn't that make sense? I think Bush is mistaken to dismiss this criticism as factually absurd when in reality the absurdity lay in some folks' interpretation of the facts. He said in his August 21, press conference that the notion the Iraq war stirred up a "hornet's nest" "just doesn't hold water as far as I'm concerned." He added, "The terrorists attacked us and killed 3,000 of our citizens before we started the freedom agenda in the Middle East."

That's all fair enough. But, why shouldn't we think that the Iraq war has increased terrorism in the world, or at least the risk of it? The hornet's nest analogy is apt, albeit cliched. We were stung--and stung badly--well before the Iraq war. And after the multiple stings of 9/11 we decided to take the fight to nests.

If my backyard is festooned with hornet nests, I will likely be safer from a sting on any given day if I do nothing than I will be on the day or days I begin destroying them. Since when is any large, important, task required to show positive results at every stage? Declaring war on Japan increased the threat of war from Germany dramatically. And waging war on both countries, obviously, made things less safe for Americans in the short run. As I wrote a long time ago, lots of things go badly until they go well.

This is clearly a much more effective rhetorical response to the NIE than the reflexive reality-denying that we've seen so far from defenders of the Iraq War. Just compare Goldberg's post to Robert Kagan's op-ed in the Post this morning. While Kagan is clearly going to elaborate lengths to avoid the obvious, Goldberg acknowledges the difficultly of the struggle and tells us that the going always gets tough before it gets better. Of course the Iraq war has created a temporary uptick in the terrorism threat, he argues; what battle worth fighting wouldn't have such an consequence?

Unfortunately, this new talking point, though superficially more reasonable, is just as weak analytically. The hornet analogy might make some sense if we had only invaded Afghanistan. That was the "nest," so to speak, of the hornets who stung us so badly on 9/11. Had our attempts to eliminate that nest provoked a few additional stings, it would have been relatively easy to dismiss that as the unavoidable consequence of a necessary action.

But there's no getting around the fact that there just weren't any hornets' nests in Iraq. If we're going to stick within the confines of this tired analogy, invading Iraq was like taking a big stick and repeatedly whacking a tree in the general vicinity of a hornet's nest. You don't accomplish anything, but you do stir up the bees.

Goldberg writes:

Since when is any large, important, task required to show positive results at every stage? Declaring war on Japan increased the threat of war from Germany dramatically. And waging war on both countries, obviously, made things less safe for Americans in the short run.

But these historical comparisons are entirely inapposite. It is one thing to accept a short-term increase in danger in exchange for eventual victory. But where's the light at the end of the tunnel in Iraq? The ostensible purpose of our invasion of Iraq was to reduce the threat of terrorism, at least in the long term. Does anyone still think that's a likely outcome?

Moreover, when we fought Japan and Germany, we had very different goals. We were trying to defeat enemy states. We could be confident that if we toppled those regimes, the violence would cease. But when you are fighting a group of stateless jihadists, the only way to make progress is to reduce the number of jihadists. If your strategy results in a net increase in the number of jihadists, it is, almost by definition, a bad strategy.

Sooner or later, the defenders of the Iraq invasion are going to have to face this reality honestly. A losing strategy can only be spun for so long.

UPDATE: Here's the relevant passage from the newly declassified "Key Judgments" section of the NIE:

We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.

• The Iraq conflict has become the "cause celebre" for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight.

In other words, our invasion and continued presence in Iraq has both inspired and provided a training ground for a new generation of jihadists, and if we leave, they will only be further embolded and inspired. Fantastic. I believe that's pretty much the definition of a no-win situation.